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The United States has properly identified East Africa and the Horn as the
region in Sub-Saharan Africa most threatened by indigenous and international
terrorism. This part of the continent also stands out for the number of internal and
regional conflicts that it has experienced in recent decades.  The following analy-
sis looks generally at the role of local conflict, corruption, Islam, and other fac-
tors that contribute to acts of terrorism.  It then offers a country by country sum-
mary and concludes with some comments on US counter-terrorism policy in the
region and suggestions for the future.  
NATURE OF THE THREAT
There are three kinds of terrorism in East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania) and the Horn (Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia).  These
are acts perpetrated by organizations based outside the region, those by an organ-
ization within the region but aimed at a neighboring country, and those instigat-
ed by an internal insurgent group against authority in a single country.  An exam-
ple of terrorism emanating from outside the region was the assassination by the
Palestinian terrorist group Black September in 1973 of the American
Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission and a Belgian diplomat in Khartoum.
The attempted assassination in 1995 of Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak in
Addis Ababa by the Egyptian terrorist group Gama’at al-Islamiyya also falls in
this category.  Other examples include the bombing by al-Qaeda in 1998 of the
American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and the
simultaneous al-Qaeda attacks at Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 against an Israeli
airliner and bombing of a hotel popular with Israeli tourists. These are classic
examples of international terrorism.  The primary goal is not to injure the coun-
try where the terrorist attack takes place; rather it is designed to harm a third
party such as the United States, Egypt, or Israel.      
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Terrorism conducted by organizations in the region against neighboring
countries includes a series of attacks by Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami
(AIAI) against civilian targets in Ethiopia in the 1990s.  The Sudan-based
Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) has conducted attacks inside Eritrea that have killed
civilians although the intended targets may have been military.  The third cate-
gory includes indigenous organizations such as the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) and Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in Uganda and the militant wing of
the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF) in Ethiopia that have used terrorist attacks in Uganda and Ethiopia respec-
tively.  The LRA has occasionally operated out of southern Sudan and the ADF
out of the eastern Congo while the OLF at various times has had support from
Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan.  Both of these kinds of terrorism are intended to
embarrass, harm, or even overturn an established government in the region.
They generally are not aimed at a third party. 
A CONFLICTED REGION PRONE TO TERRORISM
The Horn of Africa has been the most conflicted part of Africa during the
last 50 years.  Although there have been long-standing disputes in places like
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, no other region
on the continent has had as many conflicts over such a long span of time.  The
root causes are numerous and sometimes complex even within a single dispute.
They include ethnic, language and cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries,
religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources including pasturage and
water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state, and the sheer desire
for power.
There are underlying conditions in East Africa and the Horn that contribute
directly to conflict and the use of terrorist tactics.  Poverty and social injustice
are widespread.  Borders are porous even by African standards.  Tanzania,
Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red
Sea or Indian Ocean.  Weapons are readily available throughout the region, but
especially in Somalia.  All of the countries have a severe shortage of financial
resources and trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements.
Corruption is endemic in the region and a particularly serious problem in sever-
al countries.  Transparency International surveyed 102 countries in 2002 for its
annual Corruption Perceptions Index.  Kenya tied Indonesia for position 96 on
the list while Uganda shared 93 with Moldova.  Tanzania vied with several
nations for position 71 and Ethiopia shared position 59 with several nations.
There were not sufficient data to rank the other countries in the region.1
Countries facing serious corruption combined with low pay for security person-
nel leave officials wide open to the temptation of accepting money from terror-
ists in return for support.     
Important to the understanding of terrorism in the region is the inter-con-
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nectedness of most of the indigenous conflicts.  They often result in refugee
flows in various directions.  Based on the author’s experience with all countries
of the region, they frequently lead to support for a dissident group in one coun-
try by a neighboring country.  That support, in turn, causes the affected country
to back another dissident organization against the offending government.  At dif-
ferent points in time, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea have supported the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) against Khartoum while Khartoum has sup-
ported the LRA against Uganda, the OLF against Ethiopia, and the EIJ against
Eritrea.  Following the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean war, Eritrea has supported
the OLF against Ethiopia.  Ethiopia responded by supporting a coalition of
Eritrean dissidents against Eritrea.  Somalia also plays this game.  This has
developed into a debilitating tit for tat in the region that shows no sign of abat-
ing.  It also increases the prospects for the use of terrorist tactics.2
The primary terrorist threat to American and Western interests comes from
those organizations that are not indigenous to the region.  Although Americans
and other foreigners sometimes find themselves at the wrong place at the wrong
time and are, therefore, caught up in attacks aimed at harming local authority, the
indigenous groups generally do not target foreigners. There have been exceptions
when attacks on bars and hotels frequented by foreign tourists or residents seem
designed to attract international publicity and/or embarrass the local government.
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda, for example, have suffered from such
attacks.
ISLAM, THE REGION, AND TERRORISM
Not all of the local groups that use terrorist tactics are linked to Islam.  The
LRA claims to be a Christian fundamentalist organization based on the Ten
Commandments.  A cult-like group, it has used terrorism in its campaign against
the government of Uganda.3 The ADF consists of a diverse coalition of former
members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda and Islamists from
the Salaf Tabliq faction.  The external terrorist organizations, on the other hand,
are all linked to radical Islamic fundamentalism and target Western, pro-Western,
and Israeli interests.  The most threatening external group in this regard is al-
Qaeda.  Experience shows that these external terrorist organizations can function
with only a small number of local supporters.  There are also numerous Islamic
non-governmental organizations in East Africa and the Horn.  Some of them,
which are usually funded by persons or even governments in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States, wittingly or otherwise offer cover for terrorists.4
Every country discussed in this analysis has either a predominantly Islamic
population or has a significant Muslim minority.  Sudan’s population of about 36
million is between 60 and 70 percent Muslim.  At least 45 percent of “Christian”
Ethiopia’s 67 million people are Muslim. This means that Ethiopia’s approxi-
mately 30 million Muslims tie it with Morocco for the 11th most populous
Fall 2003
82
Muslim nation in the world.  Eritrea’s 4.3 million people are divided about equal-
ly between Christians and Muslims.  Although Djibouti has only about a half mil-
lion people, some 94 percent are Muslim.  Somalia and Somaliland together total
about 7.5 million people; 99 percent are Muslim.  Kenya has a population of
about 31 million.  There are wide variations in the estimates of Muslims, but
most fall in the 10 to 30 percent range.  Uganda’s population of 24 million con-
tains the smallest proportion of Muslims at about 16 per cent.  There are some 37
million Tanzanians, 35 percent of whom are Muslim.  Zanzibar is 99 percent
Muslim.  Except for a significant minority in Sudan and a smaller group in
Somalia, the vast majority of Muslims in East Africa and the Horn have shown
no interest in Islamic fundamentalism.  Nevertheless, it is not surprising that
organizations like al-Qaeda and Gama’at al-Islamiyya have been able to recruit
from this population small numbers of local collaborators.5
SUDAN
Sudan constitutes a special case because it has a long history of tolerance
toward and support for terrorist groups.  This policy existed even during the
Muhammad Gaafur al-Nimeiry government, which remained in power until
1985.  During the latter part of the Nimeiry reign the US had in Sudan its largest
military assistance program in sub-Saharan Africa and a huge development aid
program.  A military coup in 1989 overthrew the elected Sadiq al-Mahdi gov-
ernment and resulted eventually in the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic
regime.  A sharp deterioration in relations with the US followed.  The Clinton
administration placed Sudan in 1993 on the list of states that sponsor terrorism.
In announcing the decision, the State Department’s press spokesman, Mike
McCurry, stated:  “The cumulative weight of the evidence establishes that Sudan
is providing repeated support for international terrorism.  The evidence current-
ly available indicates that Sudan allows the use of its territory as sanctuary for
terrorists, including the Abu Nidal organization and members of Hezbollah and
Palestine Islamic Jihad.”6
The first suggestion that Sudan was willing to cooperate in a limited way
against terrorism occurred in 1994 when it turned over to the French the infa-
mous terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carlos the Jackal, who had been
living in Khartoum during the previous year.  Khartoum became miffed when
Washington did not express any appreciation.7 Sudan made another effort in
1996 when, at the request of the US, it removed from the country Osama bin
Laden, who had been living there since 1991.  The US took note of this devel-
opment and then made new demands of Sudan.  Sudanese officials interpreted
this as a case where the US “raised the bar” before there could be any improve-
ment in relations.  In any event, additional Sudanese overtures do not seem to
have been pursued vigorously by the US.  The low point occurred in 1998 when
the US bombed the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum with cruise mis-
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siles in response to the al-Qaeda attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam.  The US claimed there was a link between the factory and al-
Qaeda, adding that it had evidence of possible chemical weapons production
involving al-Shifa.  Sudan denied all these charges.8
There was no additional US-Sudan engagement on counter-terrorism until
President Omar Al-Bashir managed to neutralize the militant Islamic wing of his
government represented by Hassan al-Turabi.  There were then tentative steps at
the end of the Clinton administration to test a better relationship with Sudan on
counter-terrorism.  The new Bush administration presented an opportunity for
both countries to evaluate the bilateral relationship and explore further coopera-
tion.  September 11 focused the attention of Sudan and the US counter-terrorism
cooperation increased significantly after this tragedy. 
Comparison of the entries for Sudan in the 1999 and 2002 State
Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism is instructive.  The 1999
report states: “Sudan in 1999 continued to serve as a central hub for several inter-
national terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization.
The Sudanese Government also condoned Iran’s assistance to terrorist and radi-
cal Islamist groups operating in and transiting through Sudan.  Khartoum served
as a meeting place, safe haven, and training hub for members of the Lebanese
Hizballah, Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, HAMAS, and Abu Nidal organization . . ..”9 In sharp contrast, the 2002
report concluded that “while concerns remain regarding Sudanese Government
support for certain terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic
Jihad, the US is pleased with Sudan’s cooperation and the progress being made
in their antiterrorist activities.”10
Progress with Sudan on counter-terrorism has been impressive and is con-
tinuing.  Although there has been minimal improvement in the human rights sit-
uation in Sudan, there may be, with US help, an end to the long-running civil
war.  This is happening in spite of a faction in the Sudanese body politic that wel-
comes support for terrorists and what must be major pressure on Sudan from
groups like Gama’at al-Islamiyya to continue its support for terrorist organiza-
tions.  Sudan has not been a significant supplier of homegrown terrorists.  Rather,
it has for decades offered hospitality and encouragement to a variety of external
terrorist organizations.  So long as Sudan continues to cooperate with the US and
others, it should be easier to deal with the problem than is the case in countries
that breed significant numbers of international terrorists.  While Sudan remains
high on the list of countries where terrorist acts against Western interests could





With the largest Islamic population of any country in the region, the situa-
tion in Ethiopia deserves careful attention.  Muslim-Christian relations are sur-
prisingly good in a nation that has historically experienced several Islamic inva-
sions.  There are recent indications, however, that the environment has become
more problematic.  The situation is further complicated because the largest eth-
nic group, the Oromo, who constitute about 40 percent of the population, is 55
to 60 percent Muslim.  Many of them have aspirations for greater autonomy or
control of the Ethiopian government.  The Oromo live in a large swath of
Ethiopia that cuts through its heartland.  The OLF has not shirked in the past
from using terrorist tactics inside Ethiopia to achieve its goals.  The OLF recent-
ly denied, however, any involvement in the bombing of a passenger train on the
Djibouti-Addis Ababa route, adding that it rejects all acts of terror against the
civilian population.11 The militant wing of the Somali ONLF and the now qui-
escent Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia have also used terrorism as a
weapon.  It will be difficult for Ethiopia to end completely the use of terrorist tac-
tics by indigenous dissident groups.  It is imperative, however, that Ethiopia put
at the top of its agenda equal opportunity for the Muslim community in order to
reduce the temptation by Islamic malcontents to join forces with external Islamic
terrorist organizations.  
Although Ethiopia has a tough and effective security apparatus, it also
offers to international terrorist groups a large number of attractive Western tar-
gets.  Terrorist threat intelligence briefly forced the American and Norwegian
embassies in Addis Ababa to close down in June 2003.  Ethiopia cooperates
closely with the US on counter-terrorist issues.  But it has placed itself in a dif-
ficult position.  Ethiopia joined the coalition of the willing in the war against Iraq
although it provided no material support.  This caused some unhappiness within
Ethiopia’s Muslim community.  At one point, Ethiopian police prevented a
demonstration by Muslims in Addis Ababa.  Representatives of the Muslim com-
munity expressed regret that Ethiopia sided with the US and United Kingdom,
preferring instead that Ethiopia be neutral.  The relationship between Muslims,
Ethiopian Orthodox, and Protestants is now in flux.  It remains to be seen how
Ethiopia’s collaboration with the US on counter-terrorism issues will play out
within the Islamic community.
Ethiopia focuses its counter-terrorist efforts against AIAI, the OLF, and the
militant wing of the ONLF.  The Somali groups pose a special, political problem
for Ethiopia and the future of its counter-terrorism cooperation with the US.
Ethiopia believes that AIAI is linked to al-Qaeda.  Most Somalis, on the other
hand, deny that AIAI is a terrorist organization and, even if it once engaged in
terrorist acts against Ethiopia, they argue that it has terminated this practice.
Some Somalis go so far as to suggest that AIAI attacks against Ethiopia in the
1990s do not even qualify as terrorism.  Addis Ababa has every right to retaliate
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against AIAI when it attacks Ethiopia.  It needs to be careful, however, not to use
this as an excuse to interfere more generally in internal Somali affairs.  Most
Somalis are convinced that Ethiopia wants only to keep Somalia weak and divid-
ed.  This breeds Somali hostility and increases the probability of additional
attacks against Ethiopia.  To the extent that Ethiopia is central to US counter-ter-
rorist strategy in the region, it is essential the US not be sucked into unwise activ-
ities in Somalia. 
ERITREA
Eritrea, due to its Muslim-Christian split and location across the Red Sea
from Yemen also requires close monitoring.  Perhaps the major surprise is the
fact that terrorism has not become a serious problem.  Although it did not pro-
vide material support, Eritrea joined the coalition of the willing against Iraq.
Like Ethiopia, it seeks close collaboration with the US on counter-terrorism.
Eritrea is trying to curry favor with the US in hopes of support on matters relat-
ed to the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute.  Having lost the war to Ethiopia, it especially
wants the border demarcation to go forward as determined and announced by the
international arbitration panel.  The conflict broke out in 1998 in a small section
of the border known as Badme, which the arbitration panel awarded to Eritrea.
Ethiopia says this is unacceptable.  As a result, the experts have not yet begun
border demarcation and the situation remains tense.12
Both Ethiopia, now with Sudanese backing, and Eritrea engage in tit for tat
support of groups hostile to the other country.  Early in 2003 the EIJ, probably
operating out of Sudan, planted land mines that killed five Eritrean militia.  For
its part, Asmara remains the headquarters for a northern Sudanese opposition
group known as the National Democratic Alliance, assists the SPLA against
Sudan, and supports the OLF against Ethiopia.  Eritrea has an effective security
service but it also has a significant Western presence that may eventually attract
international terrorists.  
DJIBOUTI
Tiny, Muslim Djibouti is located across from Yemen and near the Strait of
Bab el Mandeb, a critical chokepoint where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden.
Before the 11 September attacks, the US maintained a minimal presence in
Djibouti and attached little importance to the country.  Everything changed after
11 September.  Djibouti became in 2002 the headquarters for the Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).  This unit coordinates coalition count-
er-terrorism operations in the total airspace and land area of Somalia, Kenya,
Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen.  The Commander of the US-led
counter-terrorist task force is Brig. General Mastin M. Robeson.  The American
component, all of which moved ashore in May 2003 to the former French bar-
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racks at Camp Lemonier, numbers more than 1,800 military and civilian person-
nel representing all branches of the US armed forces.  The CJTF-HOA forces are
based in Djibouti while a small number of liaison personnel work in other parts
of the region.13
The mission of CJTF-HOA is to detect, disrupt, and defeat international
terrorist groups in conjunction with coalition partners in the region.  This
includes identifying al-Qaeda “sleeper cells” and neutralizing any al-Qaeda safe
havens in the region. It emphasizes the denial of safe havens, external support,
and material assistance for terrorist activity.  CJTF-HOA also provides security
assistance in support of civil-military operations and supports international
organizations working to enhance long-term stability in the region.14 The New
York Times reported in November 2002 that the Central Intelligence Agency flies
classified missions from an airfield in Djibouti using the Predator, a drone
equipped with Hellfire missiles.  According to the account, one attack hit a vehi-
cle in a remote part of Yemen, killing a senior al-Qaeda operative and five other
occupants.15 The Deputy Commander of the Central Command based in Tampa,
Lt. General Michael DeLong, commented in May 2003 that working with friend-
ly governments in the region US forces affiliated with CJTF-HOA had captured
an unspecified number of mid-level al-Qaeda operatives in several countries.16
Djibouti is the only US military base in sub-Saharan Africa.  As a result,
Djibouti has become more important to the US than at any time in history.  In
addition to CJTF-HOA, some 3,200 French military personnel are stationed in
Djibouti.  This makes it a rich target for terrorist attack.  In a place as small as
Djibouti, however, the overwhelming Western security presence may discourage
potential attacks and force terrorists to seek out softer targets in the region.  So
far, there has been no significant, negative reaction from Djibouti’s Islamic pop-
ulation to either the coalition military presence or the war against Iraq.  
SOMALIA
Somalia is another special case because it has been without an effective
national government since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.  (The for-
mer Northern Province, Somaliland, declared its independence from Somalia in
1991.  Although recognized by no country, it is now generally peaceful and not
subject to the terrorist concerns presented by the situation in Somalia.)  The
organization of most concern, AIAI, follows Wahhabi doctrine that emanates
from Saudi Arabia.  Wahhabism constitutes a strict form of Islam similar to the
Taliban.  Its goal is to create a Somali Islamic state that incorporates those
Somalis living in Ethiopia.17 AIAI conducted terrorist attacks from Somalia
against Ethiopia in the 1990s.  Ethiopia retaliated on several occasions against
AIAI inside Somalia.  AIAI seems to have changed tactics in recent years by dis-
persing its followers and focusing on support for Islamic schools and social pro-
grams.  The US placed AIAI on its Terrorist Exclusion List in 2001.
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AIAI’s links to al-Qaeda are unclear.  The British government announced
in 2001 that Mohamed Atef, now deceased and whose al-Qaeda duties included
training and organizing military and terrorist operations, traveled to Somalia in
1992 and 1993 to encourage attacks against US and UN forces.  According to this
account, Atef trained Somalis to fight UN forces and al-Qaeda operatives par-
ticipated in the October 1993 attack that resulted in the eventual departure of the
US from Somalia.  In a November 1996 interview with an Arabic-language
newspaper, Osama bin Laden for the first time took credit publicly for helping
Somali factions against the Americans in Mogadishu. Bin Laden’s claim
appeared three years after the fact and did not refer specifically to the 3-4
October 1993 battle popularized by the book and movie Black Hawk Down.18
Other sources, including American military personnel who were present at the
time, are highly skeptical of the alleged connection in 1992 and 1993 between
AIAI and al-Qaeda.  In any event, there does not appear to be much trust
between AIAI and al-Qaeda although there has almost certainly been contact.   
A failed state, Somalia continues to be governed as a series of fiefdoms
supported largely by the business class and the militias they finance.  There is
some evidence that AIAI has infiltrated elements of the business community.19
Islamic charities, especially al-Islah, provide considerable aid to Somalis and
may be susceptible to penetration by terrorists.  The situation in Somalia raises
serious concerns and could attract terrorists chased from other areas such as
Afghanistan.  While this is true, Somalia is no Afghanistan.  Clan ties are more
important than religious ones.  There are few places to hide and non-Somalis are
highly conspicuous in Somali society.  Somalis are pragmatic and quick to shift
loyalties.  They would not hesitate to expose an outsider if they found it in their
interest.  While terrorists from al-Qaeda or other external groups probably tran-
sit Somalia from time to time, there is no evidence it has become a base of oper-
ation.  This is the conclusion of the 2003 Report of the Panel of UN Experts on
Somalia.  The report added, however, that non-Somali terrorists apparently tran-
sited Somalia with their weapons en route to the 2002 bombing of the hotel in
Mombasa, Kenya.20 The potential for terrorist activity emanating from Somalia
is real and requires close monitoring, but many observers have overstated the
threat.  In addition, there are virtually no attractive, Western terrorist targets
remaining inside Somalia.
KENYA, UGANDA, AND TANZANIA
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are well aware of the dangers of interna-
tional terrorism.  All three governments cooperate with the US on counter-ter-
rorism programs.  Kenya has been especially forthcoming and participates in the
US Terrorist Interdiction Program.  It is one of only two countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa to have a military access agreement with the US.  Tanzania cooperated last
year with the US on civil aviation security, anti-money-laundering initiatives,
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border control, and police training.  Uganda joined the coalition of the willing
against Iraq, albeit without offering material support.  All three countries are con-
strained by inadequate resources and lack of trained personnel.  They are all soft
targets and offer a rich assortment of Western targets.  Sixteen people died in
1980 during a terrorist attack on the Israeli-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi.  The
al-Qaeda attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
in 1998 and then against the Israelis in Mombasa in 2002 underscore this point.21
Tanzania and Kenya are easily accessible surreptitiously by sea and both
have a small, radicalized Islamic element that has assisted outside terrorist
groups.  Kenya has a particularly porous border with ungoverned Somalia.  The
Kenyan government has long been concerned about the activities of the Islamic
Party of Kenya, an unregistered organization with significant strength on
Kenya’s Swahili coast and one that has had frosty relations with the US.  A sup-
port network for terrorists has developed along the coast where persons coming
from the Gulf States, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Comoro Islands can blend in
with ease.  Pervasive corruption among Kenyan immigration personnel makes it
possible for these individuals to obtain citizenship and engage in legitimate cover
businesses.  Once all the facts are known, it may well be that al-Qaeda has
stronger links along the Swahili coast than it does in Somalia, where the US has
focused most of its attention.22
Following the 11 September attacks against the US, Kenyan police arrest-
ed about 20 persons in Mombasa on suspicion of links with al-Qaeda.  Until
recently, however, the government of Kenya did not arrest any Kenyan nationals
suspected of aiding the al-Qaeda terrorists.  It chose to ignore the links to
Kenyans and the need to provide more assistance to the disaffected Muslim
minority on the coast.  This began to change after the November 2002 attacks in
Mombasa.  Nevertheless, the United Nations anti-terrorism committee criticized
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in mid-2003 for failing to submit on schedule a
report on terrorist activities in their territory.23
There was another security scare in May/June 2003 reportedly based on
intercepted al-Qaeda communications.  The United Kingdom issued an adviso-
ry against travel to Kenya and banned British Airways flights to and from Kenya.
The US issued a similar advisory, authorized the voluntary departure of
American embassy personnel and briefly closed the Nairobi embassy in June.  In
response, Kenya arrested several more suspected terrorists and banned flights to
and from Somalia.24 In mid-September, the US extended the warning to
American nationals and interests throughout East Africa.
Late last year a small number of the Muslim faithful in Dar es Salaam con-
ducted special prayers for the destruction of the US and its leaders.  There are
increasing signs of militancy developing in certain mosques on Zanzibar and
along the Tanzania coast.  In a recent interview with Jane’s Intelligence Review,
Zanzibar’s President Amani Abeid Karume did not deny the possible presence of
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al-Qaeda on the island.25 Foreign elements encourage Islamic militancy in
Tanzania under cover of providing funds to build new mosques and by infiltrat-
ing legitimate businesses such as banking.  Tanzania is slowly beginning to take
the threat more seriously.  Several Tanzanian banks recently froze the accounts
of some individuals and organizations suspected of funding terrorism in the
country.26
Uganda hosts two organizations – the ADF and LRA – that the US added
to its Terrorist Exclusion List in 2001.  There have been numerous attacks by the
Christian LRA against civilian targets in northern Uganda over the past two
years.  Although Uganda’s Islamic community is relatively small, it is still capa-
ble of being radicalized.  A recent Pew Research Center poll in Uganda deter-
mined that more than one-quarter of Ugandans thought suicide bombing and
other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in defense of Islam.27
Although it is important not to overstate the importance of this anecdotal infor-
mation, it should give governments in the region and the US cause for serious
concern.  It also underscores the need to bring these minority Islamic communi-
ties in all three East African countries into the mainstream of the political process
and to ensure that they receive their fair share of state resources.  This will only
be possible if enlightened leadership in the three countries appreciates more fully
the nature of the threat posed by terrorism.  
THE US RESPONSE 
The challenge for the US in countering terrorism in East Africa and the
Horn is considerable.  Groups engaged in or supportive of terrorist tactics are
numerous, complex, and not easy to monitor.  In the case of Islamic communi-
ties, it is important to track any terrorist links in cooperation with host govern-
ment intelligence organizations.  Looking to the future, it is even more important
that the US show an interest in the Muslim communities and identify ways that
American assistance can support them.  In the case of Ethiopia, the embassy
opened the door several years ago to the Supreme Islamic Council by offering
help in the fight against HIV/AIDS.  Other innovative ways, perhaps in the areas
of health and education, must be found to improve relations between these com-
munities and the US. Improved American public diplomacy alone is not ade-
quate.
The US has identified East Africa and the Horn as the priority region in
Africa for counter-terrorism cooperation because of its past history of terrorist
acts.  It has created a fund of nearly $100 million to increase the capacity of the
countries in the region to combat terrorism.28 The key countries in this effort are
Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.  Training is already well advanced in Ethiopia and
Kenya while Djibouti hosts the CJTF-HOA.  Smaller training programs will take
place in Tanzania, Uganda, and Eritrea.  Somalia does not have a government in
control of the country and is not, therefore, in a position to develop a counter-ter-
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rorism program.  The US seems to be in a quandary as to how it should treat
Somaliland, which has established control over most of the country but is still
unrecognized.  This should not prevent the US from cooperating on issues such
as counter-terrorism.  Sudan remains on the US list of state sponsors of terror-
ism.  Nevertheless, CJTF-HOA personnel visited Sudan in May 2003 when they
highlighted the improvement in relations between Sudan and the US.29 It is time
to reassess whether Sudanese cooperation on counter-terrorism merits removing
the country from the list and ending American sanctions.       
Indigenous insurgent groups that use terrorist tactics pose a greater chal-
lenge because by definition they are trying to harm governments that the US sup-
ports.  Working with host governments, there may be cases where the US can
serve as an intermediary to help resolve differences with certain insurgent
groups.  The US tried this several years ago without success in the case of
Ethiopia and the OLF.  The time may be ripe to try again.  There are other groups,
for example AIAI and the LRA, which do not lend themselves to this approach.
Perhaps the most that can be done in such cases is to expand the effort to collect
intelligence on them and implement training and appropriate counter-terrorism
programs.  In the final analysis, helping to eliminate the conditions that give rise
to the alienation of groups that use terrorism, better intelligence on those that per-
sist anyway, and carefully designed counter-terrorism programs are the most
effective ways to deal with the threat in East Africa and the Horn.  
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